Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NS | 3569s |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 3569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
pdns13.domaincontrol.com
2026031312
dns.jomax.net
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 28800s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 7200s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 600s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Independent RFC compliance assessment for GoDaddy. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.
GoDaddy enforces a minimum TTL of 600 seconds (10 minutes). RFC 1035 defines TTL as a value between 0 and 2^31−1 seconds, with no mandated minimum. The 600-second floor prevents administrators from setting shorter TTLs that may be needed for ACME challenges or rapid failover scenarios.
Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | default._bimi.leeashley.com (BIMI default record) |
| Value | v=BIMI1; l=https://leeashley.com/brand/logo.svg |
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | leeashley.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent
MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)
- Mode:
enforce - Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
- MX Patterns: smtp.google.com
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent
TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
in.mailhardener.com |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1;
|
DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.
Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)
Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
Could not fetch security.txt
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No significant AI surface findings
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on pdns14.domaincontrol.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameservers: pdns14.domaincontrol.com, pdns13.domaincontrol.com
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
| DS Key Tag | DS Algorithm | DNSKEY Key Tag | DNSKEY Algorithm |
|---|---|---|---|
| 42424 | 13 | 42424 | 13 |
| 52416 | 13 | 52416 | 13 |
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pdns13.domaincontrol.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
pdns14.domaincontrol.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
pdns13.domaincontrol.com: 2.026031312e+09pdns14.domaincontrol.com: 2.026031312e+09Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for leeashley.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pdns13.domaincontrol.com |
97.74.110.56 | None | AS26496 | 2026031312 | |||
pdns14.domaincontrol.com |
173.201.78.56 | None | AS44273 | 2026031312 |
2 ASNs, 2 /24 prefixes across 2 nameservers
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive Healthy
DNSSEC operations healthy — keys, signatures, and denial-of-existence all nominal — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.
DNSKEY Inventory 4 Keys
| Role | Key Tag | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | 57641 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
| ZSK | 19427 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
| KSK | 42424 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
| KSK | 52416 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures
No RRSIG records found.
Denial of Existence NSEC
NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.
Rollover Readiness Ready
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
All 1 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy
Policy Assessment Primary
- MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
- TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
- Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
mailto:d0a11287@in.mailhardener.comLive Probe Supplementary
| MX Host | STARTTLS | TLS Version | Cipher | Certificate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
smtp.google.com |
TLSv1.3 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
Valid
Expires: 2026-06-01 (60 days) Issuer: Google Trust Services |
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Info
No IP addresses to look up
Edge / CDN Success
Domain appears to use direct origin hosting
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service
Detected 1 SaaS verification record
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
google-site-verification=OXLlOv363-fvwKD-gi9tE57Rwlip9tMFjpszDLUc-BQ |
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Verified
2 nameserver(s) configured
CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344