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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 17 Feb 2026, 00:00 UTC
Duration 4.4s
Version v26.19.17
Integrity d1040c36ba5b4e455413e35fb3f1d55c7ab301b551265395f01d798560ff56dd0ffaf2eb7748c299ad6c50a0dc1dc62e4ef42b28ad01e5b45bcb748f1d1c4739
Subject Domain
fugro.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

fugro.com
17 Feb 2026, 00:00 UTC · 4.4s ·v26.19.17 · SHA-3-512: d104✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Proofpoint 6 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Suggested Scanner Configuration Medium Confidence
Based on 8 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 39.5s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.fugro.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://fugro.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostfugro.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.fugro.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@fugro.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.fugro.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=fugro.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Key-Systems GmbH
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Proofpoint
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf-0002cd01.pphosted.com include:_u.fugro.com._spf.smart.ondmarc.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com; ruf=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com;
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 5 selector(s)

Mail routed through Proofpoint (security gateway) — DKIM signed by Microsoft 365 (sending platform). This is a standard enterprise architecture.
k2._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
s1._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2bI0HjaP+zlFqA+QcxQOOJcwyTh3FSiOkIQNvhhKMiW8DPRxFFpLj22CDWBcWHqKLGdagi7rA5ysFjtxUBWTaQSCM/ZRwMG27xd7tON6e+JGrcx5WnlqEFQdHEO8RKrcyE9HDa5dFlUbln1BMo5a1ZZL3DcPfFBNMqJ5T3BSeN0p8uKK5FusaScABrhRF2x3AFVyLxOXRInew4+HsgAbNccyaLxeTY40UCEnn0ItQy0nkWpF2OMs1LlsZjiD4I8zGAwsmZbXXvSi98HUubn7vnfROqZwO2iQVK68PpwKVeiljXSTFi4LyUW0AScQgObg5TRlnA1YCW4/aEhnbWb4SQIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCpLK0/kisW4TA9+NiV0y4rrtWA9XGE/MlBX/OS3Blvj3MbSR+ojyKc9RPuUtLQwPMH2L4lsZCxXyfCXgWkJa8ZH5OLc6CAAGwkIlYqL77wx4FoVGVPvNu71XvhC/9AxhbnMUe8btKNhc1J63BcGEFfa6ac0LvRoxgW/TN79lINqwIDAQAB
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2rgMnwkX9fG1TAL0BL6jyDIUseq02708dBy5e/SFfBv2Ph17xmRnKXUNiMyRxTDFP09xzsualmdppiVolvWgBpuoBq9daVtkr3zLTDPSeV1CzxPmI510wtqbKwV0p/gRyhZ1bt19vmWDs/kz2LeLr2rJ4c4ggM4KMfq1/Oqb79oGMwyyGjT1AMBqI9K7G/fY5veVmvB/nfxAX1r1FWfwgiCu05FzAWeqpkxxJ7u0Fabw89AQr727G6jqXByc5hPQGaNE7PcP57EY2NTJPKVIoAT3AIzxs0brbUDPlxfKfl2Ad1dLYAnw+MQfmfzxnW0+rmPU7kDAx9961jL9FBrKiQIDAQAB;
selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAz9yDdUBc/ZEiKzfDT95sEx6Fy3WDbddXm09SN2EiOZYO7M2yTeChOzPxp7FI5pFWpUtQLiAVj4gpk2DtyA49cbYhnHyxrDlOhLtMoJgl+Do8IaoRHHEFV2Vvo7XxExJmJRS8PxWDBIba7/P++EfvDV7jzReRWIy5hNpoyULDXSO3ETNpVErB73yROGGLgLxSPj/F7QbKsSFnPjZ3DK4pxzdtRxewwTdmtU3YkkYkpZacaPg/FerDvKD4yIvfxv53RAo2mqikNzyA0BPPtIRGbmnZ56eyxvcz9rK/1aCh/Qf2jFtGPysArGEesSqqjtR9csTsLuQya2ReF/UC8NfzyQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
inbox.ondmarc.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Proofpoint

Proofpoint is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing, but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction — visual and certificate-based brand faking remains possible

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Proofpoint enforces TLS on managed mail transport
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — SMTP probe skipped — outbound TCP port 25 is blocked by cloud hosting provider. This is standard for all major cloud platforms (AWS, GCP, Azure, Replit) as an anti-spam measure. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records above, which is the standards-aligned primary method per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
76.76.21.93 → AS16509 (76.76.21.0/24)
76.76.21.241 → AS16509 (76.76.21.0/24)

Edge / CDN Success Amazon CloudFront

Domain is served through Amazon CloudFront

Behind CDN Origin Visible
ASN 16509 is Amazon CloudFront

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 6 services

Detected 6 SaaS verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Apple apple-domain-verification=9XyBsvDVI18zrqoX
Amazon SES amazonses:h9PDC7xncUTaQPR9bQUvdcvSvOYd3v3jzqHKYMx/g6E=
Google google-site-verification=DCuL3kMVAVyd1VNQkM9zYzmzlQRM8s8LwJvd2tjYJOQ
Microsoft MS=ms86584078
Miro miro-verification=713718be322527229e6d03a4d341f0d08c393157
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=shtB7j2KMrU5aVFCdxTDaKN23WvY9QILlCtqoYGdNxYzSrZBw6x7BF3MJbRypW7v
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns01.brandshelter.com ns02.brandshelter.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [51633224bc924147a1355ba44b12833c K48H3PEF4HIAV1L0L1TJZDEDMWBCR21P5FYA843B MS=ms86584078 apple-domain-verification=9XyBsvDVI18zrqoX asv=25460916558990ca1b3ef24aac4ce88b autodesk-domain-verification=IBkZj0ynoJmmDwcnQTX- d365mktkey=4fdcnlw7xnat45a15sf1jlcso dzv45gvtsrlkrf9gqqp749r2tsfwmhcb msfpkey=1cun36d726kodl08cbljl4djp]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

76.76.21.93
76.76.21.241
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

8 mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
8 mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Proofpoint

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 5 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 12 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
CT logs unavailable 12 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
build.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
cloud.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
ftp.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
internal.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
login.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
mail.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
maps.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
media.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
search.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
support.fugro.com DNS Current — — — —
web.fugro.com DNS Current www.fugro.com — — —
www.fugro.com DNS Current cname.vercel.com — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
76.76.21.93
76.76.21.241
76.76.21.241
76.76.21.93
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.fugro.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com; ruf=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com;
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com; ruf=mailto:d5c670da@inbox.ondmarc.com,mailto:rso-dmarc@fugro.com;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
8 mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
8 mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
8 mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
8 mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns01.brandshelter.com.
ns01.brandshelter.com.
ns02.brandshelter.net.
ns02.brandshelter.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns01.brandshelter.com. tech.brandshelter.com. 2026021100 10800 3600 604800 300
ns01.brandshelter.com. tech.brandshelter.com. 2026021100 10800 3600 604800 300
TXT RFC 7208 §4 23 / 0 records
apple-domain-verification=9XyBsvDVI18zrqoX
—
51633224bc924147a1355ba44b12833c
—
msfpkey=1cun36d726kodl08cbljl4djp
—
paloaltonetworks-site-verification=82441873f546aaf8c9b65c662e1c72766c79cab2d68dbb12b8f964c6764e6ccd
—
autodesk-domain-verification=LAcqBDeduvSNCkUi819W
—
97447d8a819f36cc4199e66918cd381c24c2bd247bfdfd68e0
—
amazonses:h9PDC7xncUTaQPR9bQUvdcvSvOYd3v3jzqHKYMx/g6E=
—
v=spf1 include:spf-0002cd01.pphosted.com include:_u.fugro.com._spf.smart.ondmarc.com -all
—
dzv45gvtsrlkrf9gqqp749r2tsfwmhcb
—
asv=25460916558990ca1b3ef24aac4ce88b
—
K48H3PEF4HIAV1L0L1TJZDEDMWBCR21P5FYA843B
—
shtB7j2KMrU5aVFCdxTDaKN23WvY9QILlCtqoYGdNxYzSrZBw6x7BF3MJbRypW7v
—
autodesk-domain-verification=IBkZj0ynoJmmDwcnQTX-
—
W51MiZTacUAZ51f6ZZx4hYjIVO55ay0rl9md/Tn1ofHw30fDXpKyr/OZR7rgfZRACAPDUbr54l236FexvBG4fA==
—
google-site-verification=DCuL3kMVAVyd1VNQkM9zYzmzlQRM8s8LwJvd2tjYJOQ
—
MS=ms86584078
—
figma-domain-verification=51f6902e5ae20c2875e83d9a7db6b9efc78cba13b928d395f00d41720776ab1b-1743062595
—
miro-verification=713718be322527229e6d03a4d341f0d08c393157
—
heybEvMBRfU9995F5IdFO/vMpyiMINfkGL4iqSMGsMBmfJaqQMyW4OrhusKuUZiNwprfRaIVv6GxMDK1AH7+Lw==
—
parsec-domain-verification=td_2kH9HFOIHDyFpxtZ1SH6BS8wLJ9
—
d365mktkey=4fdcnlw7xnat45a15sf1jlcso
—
atlassian-domain-verification=shtB7j2KMrU5aVFCdxTDaKN23WvY9QILlCtqoYGdNxYzSrZBw6x7BF3MJbRypW7v
—
sTnsE+M5kuOOu4ZfaxNNkPDw/CsVWdOyIjmqupdi26QtYmNBl0fQRbYePJrKOtC6+oC3SUI5iBj5wKqROsiHIA==
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d1040c36ba5b4e455413e35fb3f1d55c7ab301b551265395f01d798560ff56dd0ffaf2eb7748c299ad6c50a0dc1dc62e4ef42b28ad01e5b45bcb748f1d1c4739
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 17 Feb 2026, 00:00 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-fugro.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-fugro.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-fugro.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-fugro.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/1010/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for fugro.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short fugro.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fugro.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd fugro.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com:25 -servername mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.fugro.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fugro.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fugro.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.fugro.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fugro.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com:25 -servername mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fugro.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://fugro.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fugro.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fugro.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 76.76.21.93 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 93.21.76.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 76.76.21.241 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 241.21.76.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4884 runs
DKIM
Verified 4702 runs
DMARC
Verified 4867 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4686 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4865 runs
BIMI
Verified 4701 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4704 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4706 runs
CAA
Verified 4698 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short fugro.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fugro.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fugro.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fugro.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd fugro.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxa-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com:25 -servername mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.fugro.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fugro.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fugro.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.fugro.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer fugro.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fugro.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com:25 -servername mxb-0002cd01.gslb.pphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fugro.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://fugro.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fugro.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fugro.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 76.76.21.93 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 93.21.76.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 76.76.21.241 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 241.21.76.76.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

fugro.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.