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Recon Report

github.com

21 Mar 2026, 14:47 UTC · 23.5s ·v26.38.03

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Hardened

4 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps

1 weakness 1 monitoring

ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 69/100

ACC:66% CUR:73 MAT:verified

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded

MTA-STS

MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible

TLS-RPT

No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open

BIMI

No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.

0 issue "globalsign.com"

0 issuewild "digicert.com"

0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"

0 issuewild "sectigo.com"

0 issue "sectigo.com"

0 issue "digicert.com"

0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

8 nameservers detected

dns1.p08.nsone.net dns2.p08.nsone.net dns3.p08.nsone.net dns4.p08.nsone.net ns-1283.awsdns-32.org ns-1707.awsdns-21.co.uk ns-421.awsdns-52.com ns-520.awsdns-01.net

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:glb-2a3c35-public-internal.githubapp.com first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:admin.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:api.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-08-22T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:api.mcp.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 cname_target:glb-db52c2cf8be544.github.com first_seen:2025-07-31T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:api.security.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-03-10T05:45:11 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:asset-generator.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:autodiscover.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-08T21:06:39 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:awesome-copilot.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:blog.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-03-08T13:45:40 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:bug-bash.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:communication.github.com.cname.campaign.adobe.com first_seen:2025-06-19T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:communication.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:redirect.github.com first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:community.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:developer.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:developers.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:docs.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-02-14T17:51:09 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:ducky.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:glb-db52c2cf8be544.github.com first_seen:2025-05-14 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Let's Encrypt] name:education.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:mkto-sj180011.com first_seen:2025-07-06T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:emails.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:8 cname_target:gh-cert-registration-s-uat.azurewebsites.net first_seen:2025-09-05T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examadmin-uat.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-09-08T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examadmin.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:gh-cert-services-prod1.azurewebsites.net first_seen:2025-09-08T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examregistration-api.github.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

10 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Google Workspace Miro Microsoft 365 Stripe Atlassian Facebook / Meta Adobe Loom DocuSign Apple

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

2b71dbe749f6c1bc8972f553134a461a313121916d73e7a19e82c41a10356b6c3f4b9b14c28918ac24f4946fcd1ececa9b4ec7a424a3b13baacac72e8445e0be

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.38.03

Posture Hash

56c6d9c8c8a72c77…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do