Skip to main content

Recon Report

ietf.org
15 Feb 2026, 02:01 UTC · 13.6s ·v26.15.25
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Golden-fixture baseline domain. This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
6 defensive layers | 3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness 2 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit?
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Signed
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected — single point of failure
DNS Provider
Cloudflare
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:account.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:analytics.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:auth.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:dashboard.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:dev.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ftp.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:imap.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:proxy.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:sandbox.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:static.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— cname_target:cname.instatus.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:status.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:store.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:tools.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:wiki.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.ietf.org source:dns]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
06990a18a7a8c0f885fce171192eae8cbe4e7d302e4104f8539c0c8c4b046f6bb0b271205d64399430b4e7a29e273e992af494d6a3db346f503fea7f5ed6f9a3
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.15.25
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding