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DNS Tool
Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief
Generated 14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC
Duration 30.8s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity 835f764dff7a87f52a5ef456922911405075c84dfcf3eca255743726bcf541bcc72e26dfbf3e0b74a04ff5f1b6f31e52c5e98e50c39017bfd677535acb2e44dc
Subject Domain
nsa.gov

Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — nsa.gov

14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC · 30.8s · SHA-3-512: 835f✱✱✱✱ Verify
Engineer
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 3 not configured
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
No urgent actions detected. Domain security posture is well-maintained.
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Email Provider Unknown
Web Hosting Akamai
DNS Hosting Akamai Edge DNS

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Configured Policy: reject
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Enforced
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Not Configured
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not Enforced Policy-assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable: Low Risk
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.nsa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.nsa.gov TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your web services (HTTPS). Your email transport already uses DANE, which validates mail server certificates via DNSSEC without relying on CAs — so CAA is primarily relevant to your web-facing certificates.

nsa.gov CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT adds operational visibility by reporting when sending servers fail DANE validation or encounter STARTTLS issues delivering to your MX hosts. It does not add security — it monitors the security you already have.

_smtp._tls.nsa.gov TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@nsa.gov"
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.nsa.gov TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://nsa.gov/logo.svg"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

835f764dff7a87f52a5ef456922911405075c84dfcf3eca255743726bcf541bcc72e26dfbf3e0b74a04ff5f1b6f31e52c5e98e50c39017bfd677535acb2e44dc
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC