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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — evilhacker.com

14 Feb 2026, 05:55 UTC · 25.9s · SHA-3-512: d509✱✱✱✱ Verify
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Critical Risk
6 not configured
2 actions required 1 recommendation
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
Critical No SPF record
Critical No DMARC record
Recommended DKIM not discoverable via common selectors — may be configured with custom or rotating selectors (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1)
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar Tucows Domains Inc.
Email Provider Unknown
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting Unknown

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Partial
DMARC (Policy) Partial
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Ambiguous
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider No MX records available — DANE check skipped
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not Enforced Policy-assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Partial
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 7 total Achievable: Medium Risk
Critical Publish SPF record

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) tells receiving mail servers which IP addresses are authorized to send email for your domain. Without SPF, any server can claim to send as your domain.

evilhacker.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
Critical Publish DMARC policy

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) tells receivers how to handle messages that fail SPF/DKIM checks. Without DMARC, failed authentication checks are ignored. Start with p=none and rua reporting to monitor, then escalate to p=quarantine and p=reject.

_dmarc.evilhacker.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@evilhacker.com"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.evilhacker.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.evilhacker.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Verify DKIM configuration

DKIM selectors were not discoverable via common selector names. This does not confirm DKIM is absent — your provider may use custom or rotating selectors that cannot be enumerated through DNS (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1). Check your email provider's DKIM settings to confirm signing is enabled.

selector1._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

evilhacker.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.evilhacker.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@evilhacker.com"
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

d50968bc417f31a3bff9249739fcd309d5e8d0729e78dd524a3a4ae7be94766df79ef3c26b25368ab934e8fd58e1a77cf463152639c60091bd2110bdcc0966e3
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 14 Feb 2026, 05:55 UTC