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Recon Report

natashabedingfield.com
10 Mar 2026, 18:21 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.35
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
5 defensive layers | 3 attack surface gaps
2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 65/100
ACC:63% CUR:68 MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns0.directnic.com ns1.directnic.com ns2.directnic.com ns3.directnic.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:natashabedingfield.com.mta-sts.mailhardener.com first_seen:2026-01-01T17:33:09Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com port:80 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Mailhardener hosted MTA-STS port:443 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct]
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:ext-cust.squarespace.com first_seen:2026-01-15T08:31:53Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.natashabedingfield.com source:ct]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
07d5240e2bb3e9b15ef4010998c6d1fc273207728cc6fb2c0b17c549478642cff7e47d44c7b8f44716ad63ceaf2e7524dbcd775ceaba8cba56ecf89d67c80075
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.35.35
Posture Hash
2ae4d19c7a329ffc…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding