Recon Report
nsa.gov
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
5 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
68/100
ACC:65%
CUR:72
MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
6 nameservers detected
a1-107.akam.net
a11-66.akam.net
a12-67.akam.net
a2-64.akam.net
a24-65.akam.net
a5-66.akam.net
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:www.nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-01-25T20:28:21 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:apps.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-07-01T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:cesp.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 cname_target:nationalsecurityagency.github.io first_seen:2026-02-22T00:38:09 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:code.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:cybercenter.nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-01-25T20:28:21 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:cybercenter.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:6 cname_target:nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-02-19T17:12:39 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:m.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:museum.nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-01-25T20:28:21 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:museum.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:6 cname_target:oig.nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-02-19T17:12:39 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:oig.nsa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:smtp.nsa.gov source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:vpn.nsa.gov source:dns] |
map[cert_count:6 cname_target:nsa.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-02-19T17:12:39 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:www.nsa.gov source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
9f39176b14fa4e26b02d5945dc9ef2ad6b2575ce920b6fc3249acd59839dd9f128762c7c1ca2092c4ab0f5a3737cb196dcd9f91b16b896894d9b69c6f4cf51dc
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.35.35
Posture Hash
57c5067f78dea50d…