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Recon Report

amazon.com

9 Mar 2026, 14:39 UTC · 18.5s ·v26.35.32

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Hardened

4 defensive layers | 5 attack surface gaps

1 weakness

ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 67/100

ACC:65% CUR:70 MAT:verified

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded

MTA-STS

MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible

TLS-RPT

No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains

BIMI

BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

8 nameservers detected

ns1.amzndns.co.uk ns1.amzndns.com ns1.amzndns.net ns1.amzndns.org ns2.amzndns.co.uk ns2.amzndns.com ns2.amzndns.net ns2.amzndns.org

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-24T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:aat-beta.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-16T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:abbd-dashboard-test.dub.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-15T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:abppropertyuiwebsitecontent-jlb-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-16T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:abppropertyuiwebsitecontent-master-jlb-iad.iad.proxy.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-alexa-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-basic-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-cmxsubmit.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-24T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-coop.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-24T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-dodc-alpha.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-dodc.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-firetv-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-gear-alpha.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-gear.integ.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hub-au-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hub-jp-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hub-mx-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hubportal-au-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hubportal-de-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hubportal-it-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:account-hubportal-jp-gamma.corp.amazon.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

8 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Canva Stripe Microsoft 365 Google Workspace Cisco Umbrella Facebook / Meta Apple Atlassian

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

c0a397adde14786c12f29a876aef5a65bd107072fb8ebd6e3935543808d83851000240f778380fda4c78dc0c6136658f5c0de913132c029583210b18fcdcb5c4

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.35.32

Posture Hash

04a993b5573a657a…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do