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Recon Report

dpsg-radolfzell.de
9 Mar 2026, 06:28 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.32
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
8 defensive layers | 1 attack surface gaps
1 weakness 1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 63/100
ACC:52% CUR:76 MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Unlikely DMARC quarantine enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3) with BIMI brand verification (VMC-validated logo in inboxes) and CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright instead of flagging
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
bayan.ns.cloudflare.com zelda.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:a.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:academy.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:account.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:accounting.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:accounts.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ad.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:adfs.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin1.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin2.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alert.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alerts.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alpha.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:analytics.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ap-south.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ap.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:apac.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api1.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api2.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
b1062b3c329839893f419711a9ede00a840b23c42f05640af5c7c101645d409c549d4e149648818f6fbe888e2aa05bf525f7a72876b1a717096d7bc771d7b2aa
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.35.32
Posture Hash
14b61e0804113aea…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding