Recon Report
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
DANE / TLSA
MTA-STS
TLS-RPT
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains
BIMI
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
DNSSEC
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
ns1.amzndns.co.uk
ns1.amzndns.com
ns1.amzndns.net
ns1.amzndns.org
ns2.amzndns.co.uk
ns2.amzndns.com
ns2.amzndns.net
ns2.amzndns.org
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
Secret Exposure
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
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