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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — westbyforcongress.com

11 Feb 2026, 22:42 UTC · 4.8s · SHA-3-512: 3c55✱✱✱✱ Verify
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured
1 action required
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
Critical No DKIM found
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar GoDaddy.com, LLC
Email Provider Microsoft 365
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting GoDaddy

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Configured Policy: quarantine
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Enabled
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Active Mode: enforce
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Configured
Mail Transport Not Enforced Policy-assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 6 total Achievable: Low Risk
Medium Enable DKIM for Microsoft 365

DKIM is only configured for third-party services, not your primary mail platform (Microsoft 365). Enable DKIM signing in Microsoft 365 settings to cover all outbound mail.

selector1._domainkey.westbyforcongress.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
Low Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all)

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail) and no DKIM signing was detected. Without DKIM, SPF is your only line of defense — upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching. If you configure DKIM, ~all becomes the industry-standard best practice because DMARC evaluates both SPF and DKIM alignment (RFC 7489 §10.1).

westbyforcongress.com TXT "v=spf1 include:secureserver.net -all"
Low Upgrade DMARC to reject policy

Your DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages are flagged. Upgrading to p=reject blocks them entirely. Review aggregate reports to confirm legitimate senders are aligned.

_dmarc.westbyforcongress.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@westbyforcongress.com"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

westbyforcongress.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Deploy DANE/TLSA for email transport

DNSSEC is already enabled — you can strengthen email transport security by publishing DANE TLSA records. DANE binds your mail server's TLS certificate to DNS, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on SMTP connections.

_25._tcp.mail.westbyforcongress.com TLSA 3 1 1 <certificate_hash>
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.westbyforcongress.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://westbyforcongress.com/logo.svg"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

3c55e23145aa031cad5572cf2a338d58cbd431c06dc86c5ad335fecf1fa05b8894b3ec27b4f835efa6a3b4b9a4a5c6a6475ca9959ccb77894a1b35b718a8c912
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 11 Feb 2026, 22:42 UTC