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DNS Tool
Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief
Generated 11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC
Duration 9.9s
Version v26.12.17
Integrity 41da9603769831a116e8043697cf389e722035d5f23fd5167ba6c3747b5a251222800d11665967a9b348a4b5107d5fc5086482dd5c2436d5828e10a192e6fbb7
Subject Domain
ietf.org

Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — ietf.org

11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC · 9.9s · SHA-3-512: 41da✱✱✱✱ Verify
Engineer
Golden-fixture baseline domain. This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk Monitoring
5 protocols configured, 3 not configured
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Basic
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
No urgent actions detected. Domain security posture is well-maintained.
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar Cloudflare, Inc.
Email Provider Google Workspace
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting Cloudflare

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Partial Policy: none Monitor Only
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Monitoring
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Active
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not Enforced Policy-assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable: Low Risk
High Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

_dmarc.ietf.org TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@ietf.org"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.ietf.org TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

ietf.org CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.ietf.org TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@ietf.org"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

41da9603769831a116e8043697cf389e722035d5f23fd5167ba6c3747b5a251222800d11665967a9b348a4b5107d5fc5086482dd5c2436d5828e10a192e6fbb7
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC