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Recon Report

cia.gov
6 Mar 2026, 14:21 UTC · 24.1s ·v26.34.52
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
5 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 68/100
ACC:61% CUR:77 MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
0 issue "digicert.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
6 nameservers detected
a1-22.akam.net a12-65.akam.net a13-65.akam.net a16-67.akam.net a22-66.akam.net a3-64.akam.net
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-03-25T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:mail3.cia.gov source:ct]
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-03-25T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:mail4.cia.gov source:ct]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:relay1.cia.gov source:dns]
map[cert_count:6 cname_target:cia.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2025-08-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:www.cia.gov source:ct]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
44e1e743dee737ae79eb39f6710d471ae2cca30c9605f7c4c9295baa3a247597fc1679c93d0fcc46638474c1bb58452249aad0aa4370e78d51d87180ef1e07a3
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.34.52
Posture Hash
ee15880ce72278e5…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding