Recon Report
whitehouse.gov
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
5 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
68/100
ACC:60%
CUR:76
MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes — email-based brand faking is effectively blocked; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com
wally.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:apply.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000001dif72ai.live.siteforce.com first_seen:2025-12-02T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:apply.whitehouse.gov services:[map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:The White House
Requested resource was https://www.whitehouse.gov/ port:443 protocol:tcp service:https]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:events.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000001dhcc2ai.live.siteforce.com first_seen:2025-12-02T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:events.whitehouse.gov services:[map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Error Page
Requested resource was https://events.whitehouse.gov/form port:443 protocol:tcp service:https]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:prodsan.usajobs.gov.edgekey.net first_seen:2026-02-13T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:fellows.whitehouse.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:joinus.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000000merb2aq.live.siteforce.com first_seen:2026-01-01T15:49:00 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:joinus.whitehouse.gov services:[map[port:80 product:AkamaiGHost protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:JoinUs
Requested resource was https://joinus.whitehouse.gov/s/ port:443 product:AkamaiGHost protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 cname_target:wh47.go-vip.net first_seen:2026-01-26T11:37:57 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt DigiCert Inc] name:tours.whitehouse.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:visit.whitehouse.gov.00d820000008fgaeaq.live.siteforce.com first_seen:2026-01-15T17:50:28 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:visit.whitehouse.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:wh47.go-vip.net first_seen:2026-01-27T10:14:00 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:www.whitehouse.gov source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Microsoft 365
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
f110230cd48c3d047d9778a517b5e7de8b97838c0c81d3e27fabd88ac6425da352b8368c0856cd9ad950f919c87b5d9811fd9a43e3608c9229540fec04d4b7cb
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.34.52
Posture Hash
2590026882c42690…