Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail), which asks receivers to accept but flag unauthorized senders. Upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching. Note: if you later enable DMARC enforcement (p=reject or p=quarantine) with DKIM, ~all becomes acceptable because DMARC evaluates both SPF and DKIM alignment before making decisions (RFC 7489 §10.1).

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.