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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief
Generated 11 Feb 2026, 03:15 UTC
Duration 11.6s
Integrity dfab623e636ac313680da541858cc79995f87165b55e93133a1043a25a7cccf33e366dd27e94d673d0c957288cb051d5ecb2149f33cebf904731b862bb42df23
Subject Domain
freebsd.org

Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — freebsd.org

11 Feb 2026, 03:15 UTC · 11.6s · SHA-3-512: dfab✱✱✱✱ Verify
Engineer
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk Monitoring
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured
2 recommendations
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
What Requires Attention
Recommended SPF uses ~all (softfail) — consider -all (hardfail) for stricter enforcement per RFC 7208 §5
Recommended No DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) configured — unable to monitor authentication results
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar Gandi SAS
Email Provider Unknown
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting Unknown

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Partial Policy: none Monitor Only
DKIM (Signatures) Configured
Mail Posture Email: Monitoring
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Not Configured
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 1.1.1.1 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Configured
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable: Low Risk
High Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

_dmarc.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all)

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail), which asks receivers to accept but flag unauthorized senders. Upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching. Note: if you later enable DMARC enforcement (p=reject or p=quarantine) with DKIM, ~all becomes acceptable because DMARC evaluates both SPF and DKIM alignment before making decisions (RFC 7489 §10.1).

yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -all"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@yourdomain.com"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

dfab623e636ac313680da541858cc79995f87165b55e93133a1043a25a7cccf33e366dd27e94d673d0c957288cb051d5ecb2149f33cebf904731b862bb42df23
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 11 Feb 2026, 03:15 UTC