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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — 2911.us

11 Feb 2026, 00:14 UTC · 2.1s · SHA-3-512: 13ba✱✱✱✱ Verify
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured
1 action required 2 recommendations
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
Critical No DKIM found
Recommended SPF uses ~all (softfail) — consider -all (hardfail) for stricter enforcement per RFC 7208 §5
Recommended No CAA records
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar GoDaddy.com, LLC (Registrant: Jeremy Westby)
Email Provider Unknown
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting GoDaddy

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Configured Policy: reject
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Enabled
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Active Mode: enforce
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Configured
Mail Transport Not assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable: Low Risk
High Configure DKIM signing

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing emails, proving they haven't been tampered with. Enable DKIM in your email provider's settings.

selector1._domainkey.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
Medium Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all)

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail), which asks receivers to accept but flag unauthorized senders. Upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching. Note: if you later enable DMARC enforcement (p=reject or p=quarantine) with DKIM, ~all becomes acceptable because DMARC evaluates both SPF and DKIM alignment before making decisions (RFC 7489 §10.1).

yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.yourdomain.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://yourdomain.com/logo.svg"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

13ba2ee0ba17a3f4047fdc4b01c320af2def7035bcb8dc7e0b9f548a8e83bbb21e7243dcb3ee75c7ea2a9572573c830a9d67c47a76b93bd8f01317fd2d985e82
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 11 Feb 2026, 00:14 UTC