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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief
Generated 10 Feb 2026, 18:00 UTC
Duration 7.8s
Integrity 1a1b86e337f40a5a872edf2ea91c7ba7b6b00692c7209b3d32b7a598993bc21ecc11be11af4df00836da51c3aa7963692340b89f461885995b6cbefc77d203c1
Subject Domain
natashabedingfield.co.uk

Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — natashabedingfield.co.uk

10 Feb 2026, 18:00 UTC · 7.8s · SHA-3-512: 1a1b✱✱✱✱ Verify
Engineer
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk Monitoring
1 protocols configured, 4 not configured
2 actions required 2 recommendations
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
Critical SPF needs attention
Critical DMARC needs strengthening
Recommended No DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) configured — unable to monitor authentication results
Recommended No CAA records
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar Unknown
Email Provider Unknown
Web Hosting Unknown
DNS Hosting Unknown

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Partial
DMARC (Policy) Partial
DKIM (Signatures) Not Detected
Mail Posture Email: Enabled
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Partial
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable: Low Risk
Critical Configure DKIM signing

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing emails, proving they haven't been tampered with. Enable DKIM in your email provider's settings.

selector1._domainkey.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
Medium Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@yourdomain.com"
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

1a1b86e337f40a5a872edf2ea91c7ba7b6b00692c7209b3d32b7a598993bc21ecc11be11af4df00836da51c3aa7963692340b89f461885995b6cbefc77d203c1
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 18:00 UTC