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Recon Report

kisa.org.cy
2 Mar 2026, 14:23 UTC · 30.0s ·v26.28.42
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
2 defensive layers | 6 attack surface gaps
1 weakness 1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 74/100
ACC:66% CUR:85 MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — partial coverage
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
No DMARC — domain has zero email authentication enforcement
Ghost DMARC Record — a v=DMARC1 record is sitting in the root TXT zone instead of _dmarc.kisa.org.cy. Mail receivers ignore it completely. The owner thinks they have p=none but there is no valid DMARC record at _dmarc.kisa.org.cy. Zero enforcement.
v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:easy880065@easydmarc.com;fo=1
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns1-02.azure-dns.com ns2-02.azure-dns.net ns3-02.azure-dns.org ns4-02.azure-dns.info
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:— cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autodiscover.kisa.org.cy source:dns]
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mail.office365.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:webmail.kisa.org.cy source:dns]
map[cert_count:4 cname_target:kisa.org.cy first_seen:2026-02-18T19:31:43 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:www.kisa.org.cy source:ct]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
5cc0dc4c96bcc8c1037c4ff34f7c15276616b7ce74ce33d27567c300d1dd87e8abcd031cc3d40e9e80b14fbe803865bb83a854db6acde9716a08c9a25190f57e
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.28.42
Posture Hash
1eff1ef518ab9716…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding