Recon Report
sportcommunities.group
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
8 defensive layers
|
1 attack surface gaps
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
66/100
ACC:52%
CUR:82
MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ned.ns.cloudflare.com
noor.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-12-04 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Sectigo Limited] name:www.sportcommunities.group services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://www.sportcommunities.group/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:2 http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://sportcommunities.group/ port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
bffe6aec4700fba0f1975104bb8864005372755017b3cead477035c816497da51da4d233d58835be69aa4cb79cb8087cbe55996c27477b8096b65ea770c0ecb3
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.28.35
Posture Hash
b1bae160390b5c7b…