Recon Report
maltejk.de
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
6 defensive layers
|
3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
67/100
ACC:59%
CUR:76
MAT:verified
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
arya.ns.cloudflare.com
rick.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:7 first_seen:2025-12-25 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Sectigo Limited] name:cloud.maltejk.de services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://cloud.maltejk.de/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:2 http_title:Login \xE2\x80\x93 Nextcloud
Requested resource was https://cloud.maltejk.de/login port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
map[cert_count:4 cname_target:kaffenberger.kimai.cloud first_seen:2026-02-06T02:57:14 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:tempus.maltejk.de services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://tempus.maltejk.de/ port:80 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Kimai
Requested resource was https://tempus.maltejk.de/en/login port:443 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:6 first_seen:2026-02-18T04:29:58 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:www.maltejk.de services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://www.maltejk.de/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:malte jan kaffenberger port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Microsoft 365
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
d83e4c50ebf6f2c4a66221eb74c080a6ec5051085cb8eb62cd49c26236b1aaf54292313b22c35a21db417558d3d68be7e4bf5634af2561a61dced1c39991445d
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.28.35
Posture Hash
b5f2869ada93311e…