Recon Report
isc.org
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Medium Risk
6 defensive layers
|
3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
3 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 iodef "mailto:hostmaster@isc.org"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "Digicert.com"
0 issue "certainly.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issuewild "globalsign.com"
0 issuewild "trust-provider.com"
0 issue "globalsign.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "certainly.com"
0 issuewild "sectigo.com"
0 issuewild "usertrust.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
5 nameservers detected
ns.isc.afilias-nst.info
ns1.isc.org
ns2.isc.org
ns3.isc.org
nsp.dnsnode.net
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-12-18T14:57:02Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:acme.aws.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-17T20:58:53Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:altops.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-24T14:45:36Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:asteriskbsd.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-29T11:45:44Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:atlas-vis.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-03T14:59:36Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bikeshed.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-03T03:52:36Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bind.isc.org services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://bind.isc.org/ port:80 protocol:tcp service:tcpwrapped] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Internet Systems Consortium port:443 protocol:tcp service:tcpwrapped]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-12-04T08:31:29Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bugs.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-21T06:23:15Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cloak.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:clockisc.ntp.org first_seen:2026-01-03T05:01:59Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:clock.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-12-11T15:24:01Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:crowsnest-oak1.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 cname_target:crowsnest-oak1.isc.org first_seen:2025-12-11T15:24:01Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:crowsnest.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-02T13:28:28Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dagger.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-21T15:07:56Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:demo.stork.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-26T23:49:39Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dhcp.aws.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-26T23:50:48Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dhcp.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:readthedocs.io first_seen:2026-01-02T10:26:54Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:docs.bind.isc.org services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://docs.bind.isc.org/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://bind9.readthedocs.io/en/v9.20.20/ port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-02-25 is_current:true issuers:[] name:docs.isc.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:readthedocs.io first_seen:2025-12-31T21:49:25Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:docs.kea.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-31T21:49:24Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:docs.stork.isc.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:dualstack.osff2.map.fastly.net first_seen:2025-02-25 is_current:true issuers:[] name:downloads.isc.org source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Microsoft 365
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
4b8b4737770d4cff2fc22e8c10baff079665662b658885c5ef8aecc173013cdf7e646a3ff32b71fbae73b9653bc5f3b758b68262ce0eafb94793e44808483dd5
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.27.09
Posture Hash
3ef53bc4b35d0ba7…