Recon Report
it-help.tech
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
8 defensive layers
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk
ns-4.awsdns-00.com
ns-529.awsdns-02.net
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:schedule.it-help.tech services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://schedule.it-help.tech port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Appointments | IT Help San Diego \xE2\x80\x93 Apple Expert Home Visits ... port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:server.it-help.tech source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:d316lglduxncrn.cloudfront.net first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.it-help.tech services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://www.it-help.tech/ port:80 product:Amazon CloudFront httpd protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:2 http_title:Mac IT Support San Diego \xE2\x80\x93 IT Help San Diego Inc. port:443 product:Amazon CloudFront httpd protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Facebook / Meta
Apple
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
12b085d8d2b6621a068050fef46a75d31904966c080aee17b9993027694f2ddaa74dc5f68d5a06cf7bed6f755bc320472a5f3be79fcca6958d80403f8774ab30
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.27.09
Posture Hash
0690833db54fa2ca…