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DNS Tool
Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief
Generated 9 Feb 2026, 19:31 UTC
Duration 24.2s
Version v26.10.88
Integrity 29b9fb05db35001cc26b54e8f8eb92298f5006f51bad12a1e23e8288d9cc1cfbd426809c66ceba2971b04b01b70a70820efecf4982746497b4fac3eeabb14d0f
Subject Domain
hortongroup.com

Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — hortongroup.com

9 Feb 2026, 19:31 UTC · 24.2s · SHA-3-512: 29b9✱✱✱✱ Verify
Engineer
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: PARTIAL
1 protocols configured, 6 not configured
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
No urgent actions detected. Domain security posture is well-maintained.
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar GoDaddy.com, LLC (Registrant: Registration Private)
Email Provider Google Workspace
Web Hosting Amazon Route 53
DNS Hosting Amazon Route 53

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Partial Policy: none Monitor Only
DKIM (Signatures) Configured
Mail Posture Email: Enabled
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Partial
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable: STRONG
High Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@yourdomain.com
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.yourdomain.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Add TLS-RPT reporting

Publish a TLS-RPT DNS record to receive reports about TLS delivery failures to your domain.

_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@yourdomain.com"
Low Enable DNSSEC

Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider and add the DS record at your registrar. Many DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53, etc.) offer one-click DNSSEC activation.

Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

29b9fb05db35001cc26b54e8f8eb92298f5006f51bad12a1e23e8288d9cc1cfbd426809c66ceba2971b04b01b70a70820efecf4982746497b4fac3eeabb14d0f
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 9 Feb 2026, 19:31 UTC