Recon Report
red.com
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Moderate
2 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain?
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit?
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity?
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS?
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
DNS Provider
Amazon Route 53
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[autodiscover.outlook.com atod-g2.tm-4.office.com] cname_target:atod-g2.tm-4.office.com first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:autodiscover.red.com provider:Microsoft 365 provider_category:Email source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[d251ynbmdsa2xe.cloudfront.net] cname_target:d251ynbmdsa2xe.cloudfront.net first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:docs.red.com provider:AWS CloudFront provider_category:CDN source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[d1gxco57vqsng4.cloudfront.net] cname_target:d1gxco57vqsng4.cloudfront.net first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:images.red.com provider:AWS CloudFront provider_category:CDN source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[webmail.red.com mail.office365.com outlook.office365.com ooc-g2.tm-4.office.com] cname_target:ooc-g2.tm-4.office.com first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:owa.red.com provider:Microsoft 365 provider_category:Email source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[redray.zendesk.com] cname_target:redray.zendesk.com first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:support.red.com provider:Zendesk provider_category:Support source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[mail.office365.com outlook.office365.com ooc-g2.tm-4.office.com] cname_target:ooc-g2.tm-4.office.com first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:webmail.red.com provider:Microsoft 365 provider_category:Email source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[www.red.com.hosting.netsuite.com g-2rfrvfm.akamaiproperty.netsuite.com.edgekey.net e244178.x.akamaiedge.net] cname_target:e244178.x.akamaiedge.net first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:www.red.com provider:Akamai provider_category:CDN source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:mail.red.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:vpn.red.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:vpn2.red.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:zendesk.red.com source:dns] |
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
79c9aaf01cbfb94511613bb87b59bebea1bff38f9e037099d72dfcd53257b1b79b690b15f49c1f49c94c7fdde7b14a7db29c0f9ce5fd33588eabca9c9d239a9c
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.10.85