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Recon Report

ietf.org
9 Feb 2026, 05:02 UTC · 26.1s ·v26.10.79
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
3 defensive layers | 3 attack surface gaps
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain?
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit?
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity?
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS?
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected — single point of failure
DNS Provider
Cloudflare
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:analytics.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:auth.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:dashboard.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:dev.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:ftp.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:imap.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:mail2.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:meeting.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:proxy.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:registration.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:sandbox.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:static.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 cname_chain:[cname.instatus.com] cname_target:cname.instatus.com first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:status.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:store.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:wiki.ietf.org source:dns]
map[cert_count:0 first_seen: is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen: name:www.ietf.org source:dns]
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
982ec80bbf92107385b9d21d74edb8cbb630409809326981bc951ac9a45fcbf1ee2c1aa6b2eef223bb967bb40ea3c2e1e24e4fd2d1d06fd9855be9b94e9a42da
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.10.79
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding