Recon Report
evilhacker.com
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Soft Target
1 defensive layers
|
8 attack surface gaps
1 exploitable
2 weaknesses
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes no SPF or DMARC protection
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
No DMARC — domain has zero email authentication enforcement
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ns1.hover.com
ns2.hover.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:a.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:academy.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:account.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:accounting.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:accounts.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ad.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:adfs.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:admin.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:admin1.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:admin2.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alert.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alerts.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alpha.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:analytics.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ap-south.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ap.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:apac.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:api.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:api1.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:api2.evilhacker.com source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
06846c0973889742e4e2bc59b6ed1b1641d5bff127ef1ec36beec01b056f8e0f5fbbe416bca63129c114252164a09463c94341e0fed8a8c1b21764d494f90a4c
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.26.14
Posture Hash
d62f5e5ca90cdd68…