Recon Report
dpsg-radolfzell.de
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
9 defensive layers
1 weakness
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes Both MTA-STS and DANE enforce encrypted mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Unlikely DMARC quarantine enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3) with BIMI brand verification (VMC-validated logo in inboxes) and CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright instead of flagging
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
bayan.ns.cloudflare.com
zelda.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:a.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:academy.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:account.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:accounting.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:accounts.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ad.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:adfs.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin1.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:admin2.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alert.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alerts.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:alpha.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:analytics.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ap-south.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:ap.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:apac.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api1.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
map[cert_count:7 cname_target:web147.alfahosting-server.de first_seen:2025-12-08 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:api2.dpsg-radolfzell.de source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
903a329b2c7908717724c3239edc2f809ff14f61dcc938635abfed37a9987a99d422fdd9d4b42cd1851441c53ad0eb8e710e104d8501c5f1906556ca21cfcdb5
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.26.14
Posture Hash
71e3d53b9dc059eb…