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Recon Report

sportcommunities.group
25 Feb 2026, 15:51 UTC · 42.4s ·v26.26.14
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
7 defensive layers | 2 attack surface gaps
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS testing mode — reporting only, no enforcement
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ned.ns.cloudflare.com noor.ns.cloudflare.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-12-04 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Sectigo Limited] name:www.sportcommunities.group services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://www.sportcommunities.group/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:2 http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://sportcommunities.group/ port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
0801d4687180b3e274f7cfe00093d3a61c7312cd3ce16e7ee6c08d43473bd0b2ab76b9c79f692755965bdcc87dbb2870ad668b5ccf1d2ec0beea8b90e72acfdf
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.26.14
Posture Hash
2cbc4cb9e087d5eb…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding