Recon Report
fette-beute.com
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
5 defensive layers
|
3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
2 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS testing mode — reporting only, no enforcement
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns1058.ui-dns.de
ns1111.ui-dns.com
ns1116.ui-dns.org
ns1118.ui-dns.biz
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:autodiscover.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:2979373.group23.sites.hubspot.net first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:blog.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:cloud.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:deploy.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:dev.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:2979373.group23.sites.hubspot.net first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:email.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:exchange.fette-beute.com services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to http://portal.office.com/ port:80 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:2 http_title:Did not follow redirect to http://portal.office.com/ port:443 product:nginx protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:forum.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:ftp.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:git.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:gitlab.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:grafana.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:live.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:mail.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:monitor.fette-beute.com services:[map[http_title:Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8). port:80 product:Golang net/http server protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:1 http_title:Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8). port:443 product:Golang net/http server protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:share.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:upload.fette-beute.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-04-11 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:www.fette-beute.com services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://www.fette-beute.com/ port:80 product:Golang net/http server protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:4 http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://fette-beute.com/ port:443 product:Golang net/http server protocol:tcp service:http]] source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google Workspace
Apple
Facebook / Meta
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
42b02fe06efd47d12fe4aa3c1fa3e51b4fa1acf173e81f589ca95533e2d80fcb99c3fab336eb9c8203546fe18468c56725b56cb536a06f9ded20b5cfca623ec6
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.26.14
Posture Hash
4558da716f28b887…