Recon Report
steinr.eu
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
7 defensive layers
|
2 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:a.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:academy.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:account.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:accounting.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:accounts.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:ad.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:adfs.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:admin.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:admin1.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:admin2.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:alert.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:alerts.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:alpha.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:analytics.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:ap-south.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:ap.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:apac.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:api.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:api1.steinr.eu source:dns] |
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:potter.steinr.eu first_seen:2025-11-27 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:api2.steinr.eu source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Brave
Google Workspace
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
b4a2091f66e4b088410179410bbc3d263591c8106df41f78520c74cb54d82245072d6dcec0dd5f671fb3dc750ffd4f64321d9501be2894a02b7b6cce4f5381f8
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.25.65
Posture Hash
47bb1e5e70c87b5e…