Recon Report
nlnetlabs.nl
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Medium Risk
5 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-13T07:50:34Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:agent.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alpha.nlnetlabs.nl source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mailbox.org first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autodiscover.nlnetlabs.nl source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-09T00:16:39Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:aws.manson.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bartok.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bela.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:nlnetlabs.ghost.io first_seen:2026-01-18T00:00:00Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:blog.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:blogs.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-28T14:34:27Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cascade.docs.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-22T09:58:57Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cascade.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:nlnetlabs.discoursehosting.net first_seen:2026-01-23T08:50:17Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:community.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:open.nlnetlabs.nl first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:conference.nlnetlabs.nl source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dicht.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-29T15:25:06Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dnst.docs.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:bill.nlnetlabs.nl first_seen:2025-12-09T00:15:28Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dnsthought.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-06T00:15:14Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:eder.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:mailgun.org first_seen:2026-01-08T09:31:56Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:email.ghost.blog.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-06T00:16:21Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:getdns.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:gogs.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T00:22:58Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:ieniemienie.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
1Password
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
e5946f8e2acdbde0223d91dc197fdc0c80a0e994417bf1b6e64a3b8f17c976506b7d6cd5f33b82b2707e6a7fe4c4dc96b4a72af1943fccceb16392795d2dda30
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.25.65
Posture Hash
192024ca3eefe635…