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Recon Report

github.com

23 Feb 2026, 14:36 UTC · 60.7s ·v26.25.28

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Hardened

4 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded

MTA-STS

MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible

TLS-RPT

No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI

No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.

0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"

0 issue "sectigo.com"

0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

0 issue "digicert.com"

0 issuewild "digicert.com"

0 issue "globalsign.com"

0 issuewild "sectigo.com"

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

0 nameservers detected — single point of failure

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:glb-2a3c35-public-internal.githubapp.com first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:admin.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:api.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:1 cname_target:glb-db52c2cf8be544.github.com first_seen:2025-08-22T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:api.mcp.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:1 cname_target:glb-db52c2cf8be544.github.com first_seen:2025-07-31T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:api.security.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-01-08T14:25:25 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:asset-generator.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:redirect.github.com first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:autodiscover.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:blog.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-01-07T12:39:04 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:bug-bash.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:d24z2fz21y4fag.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:cloud.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:communication.github.com.cname.campaign.adobe.com first_seen:2025-06-19T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:communication.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:redirect.github.com first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:community.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:developer.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:developers.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:docs.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:github.github.io first_seen:2026-02-14T17:51:09 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:ducky.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:5 cname_target:glb-db52c2cf8be544.github.com first_seen:2025-03-07 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Sectigo Limited] name:education.github.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:mkto-sj180011.com first_seen:2025-07-06T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:emails.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:8 first_seen:2025-09-05T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examadmin-uat.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:gh-cert-registration-prod1.azurewebsites.net first_seen:2025-09-08T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examadmin.github.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-09-08T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:examregistration-api.github.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

10 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Loom Miro Facebook / Meta Google Workspace Microsoft 365 Stripe Apple Atlassian Adobe DocuSign

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

4a5709a9cf27c85b2db5dff1dfbd2b8ebfed2e7025727770773171661496e2893ecbe7602db0aa90b9ed9990ea9cc98ecf3c6011a8cb371c54328a12039ebba8

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.25.28

Posture Hash

e054443fc80fce44…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do