Recon Report
item.org
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Moderate
3 defensive layers
|
6 attack surface gaps
2 weaknesses
2 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
Ghost DMARC Record — a
v=DMARC1 record is sitting in the root TXT zone instead of _dmarc.item.org. Mail receivers ignore it completely. The owner thinks they have p=reject but the active policy is p=none. Classic misconfiguration — the security posture they believe they have does not exist.
v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;rua=mailto:your email address
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:adsredir.ionos.info first_seen:2025-06-22 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:autodiscover.item.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-06-22 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:ftp.item.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-06-22 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:learn.item.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-06-22 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:news.item.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-06-22 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:www.item.org source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
492adc4d2d2d7609eff0b92dc8720601ccc2e914aad5fa52c34582d8c0c3371ada09eebd333ce10c8fa25c1f6cb53eb0d9eb1bec0d58f2cbbb7ca22166efa678
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.23.50
Posture Hash
fb43b7c0ac078bf4…