Recon Report
usa.gov
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
4 defensive layers
|
5 attack surface gaps
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-04T20:21:23Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:1.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2025-11-25T11:01:53Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:analytics.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:answers.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-11T20:21:17Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:answers.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:api-proxy-dev.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-07T16:21:22Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:api-proxy-dev.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:api-proxy-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-07T18:21:23Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:api-proxy-stage.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-07T19:21:23Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:api-proxy.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-13T19:21:16Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:api.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:apps.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-11T20:21:16Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:apps.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-12-09T19:49:13Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:asis.search.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:benefits-tool.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2026-01-14T17:20:39Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:benefits-tool.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:beta-dev.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-29T19:21:17Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:beta-dev.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:beta-dr.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-11-25T20:00:06Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:beta-dr.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:beta-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-11-29T23:21:29Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:beta-stage.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-18T22:20:35Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:beta.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:3 cname_target:blog.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-26T15:42:14Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:blog.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:business.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-12-11T19:21:16Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:business.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-12-29T19:21:17Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cms-dev.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-11-25T20:00:01Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cms-dr.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:cms-stage.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2025-11-29T23:21:28Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cms-stage.usa.gov source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:cms.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov first_seen:2026-01-18T18:20:36Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:cms.usa.gov source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Amazon SES
Microsoft 365
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
4696cfaced9bd6f0e5e0502d732952a023b747d856b8db46f982c4df052503fe9608210a16716279d4dd3bff9996e2541c3720769c62ccc2462749a7bf51929e
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.20.85
Posture Hash
ec182e9e28ac5195…