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Recon Report

sra.io
14 Nov 2026, 07:10 UTC · 61.3s ·v26.51.0-146-ge5892c0ab
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
3 defensive layers | 5 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 72/100
ACC:66% CUR:79 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) leave brand impersonation largely unaddressed
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
pdns07.domaincontrol.com pdns08.domaincontrol.com
DNS Provider
GoDaddy
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:3 cname_target:amplifysra-cyfxhac2ajf6cxdy.eastus-01.azurewebsites.net first_seen:2026-09-15T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:amp.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-06-15T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:apps.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:argocd.internal.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autodiscover.sra.io source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:boru.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2025-12-23T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:canopener.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:collector.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:contact.beep.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:cti.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:2 cname_target:d3hh2gp5tqqui3.cloudfront.net first_seen:2026-09-29T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:docs.siftr.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-10-06T15:36:34 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:estrellita.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-10-22T16:27:17 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com DigiCert Inc GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:hal.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:3 cname_target:d1lkgp6g4qg1bo.cloudfront.net first_seen:2026-09-22T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:intel.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:securityriskadvisors.github.io first_seen:2026-09-21T07:48:46 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:labs.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:omni.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-01-15T18:06:42 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:phlfw01.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:d1yz4u0949qkev.cloudfront.net first_seen:2026-09-24T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:portal.siftr.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:3 first_seen:2026-10-23T18:32:14 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com] name:scalr.sra.io source:ct]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:services.beep.sra.io source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:siftr.sra.io source:external_tools]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
5 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Microsoft Adobe Atlassian Facebook Google
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
2ca972cb88054a3b19a2ae1a3112368dd34bd143d34a98eca6b1528ab2590bcabbfd420c742c13eb3c666fc0e65cb34945b902cb8745113defc60c034cf4b28c
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-146-ge5892c0ab
Posture Hash
9c167a9ee4b5d2b6…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding