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Recon Report

fette-beute.com
23 Oct 2026, 15:15 UTC · 62.0s ·v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
5 defensive layers | 3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 69/100
ACC:61% CUR:79 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS testing mode — reporting only, no enforcement
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC quarantine flags spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes; upgrade to p=reject to block spoofed mail outright; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns1058.ui-dns.de ns1111.ui-dns.com ns1116.ui-dns.org ns1118.ui-dns.biz
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alertmanager.monitor.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:api.party.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:api.terminal.party.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:2026-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:autodiscover.fette-beute.com source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:awt2022.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bak2023.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:baklp2022.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:barcamp.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:2979373.group23.sites.hubspot.net first_seen:2026-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:blog.fette-beute.com source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bookmarks2020.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bueb22.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bwblpazubi2022.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bwblpeltern2022.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bwblpstudierende2022.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:cloud.fette-beute.com source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:cme2021.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:corvaglia.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:deploy.fette-beute.com source:dns]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:deployment.dev.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:dev.aqa.corporate-website.deploy.fette-beute.com source:external_tools]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
5 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Apple Facebook Google Miro OpenAI
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
0926c6f46d8b8b2bd77ce4ac850897773ebdecd99492de0b9ead01a448a435bf0c259bd382e8d4ac05443fb45cdc409fa80908e298250ff1f6de907e34541839
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783
Posture Hash
5ed611dbd94cbd59…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding