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Recon Report

mx.paubox.com
1 Sep 2026, 20:45 UTC · 61.3s ·v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Soft Target
5 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps
1 weakness 2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 63/100
ACC:66% CUR:61 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC requests no enforcement (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 iodef "mailto:security@paubox.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issuewild "amazon.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected — single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
a75296f8b63a28bda261ebd0c847da0c9993381c27a4442222f948a2d1910824fbaa71f6e13ccfddb9b91c47bef46df04c0ca0818b0d7c35d66d1c23dc3f6723
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-144-g385ba8783
Posture Hash
53c37bc9f7db0cbe…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding