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Recon Report

resolutionscope.com
17 Aug 2026, 21:13 UTC · 63.2s ·v26.51.0-112-gc6eb909ed
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Soft Target
4 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps
1 exploitable 1 weakness
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 66/100
ACC:63% CUR:70 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 iodef "mailto:security@it-help.tech"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issuewild ";"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Yes DNSSEC validation is failing, DNS responses cannot be trusted
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Partially Signed — chain of trust broken
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
ns-1341.awsdns-39.org ns-1878.awsdns-42.co.uk ns-341.awsdns-42.com ns-749.awsdns-29.net
DNS Provider
Amazon Route 53
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
f192a7d4150c45164c2a1f2604d462d1cd79ac7cbbf5036dae0db76906d32200360eda4fe3232b55a7f0870c83938d6e68e75d080e08ef45ca8d280295ca5ec0
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-112-gc6eb909ed
Posture Hash
5ec0a5af1607a51e…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding