Recon Report
cloudflare.com
Golden-fixture baseline domain.
This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
6 defensive layers
|
2 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
63/100
ACC:57%
CUR:71
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 iodef "mailto:tls-abuse@cloudflare.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Unknown DNSSEC could not be confirmed — re-run to verify. This is not evidence the zone is unsigned (RFC 4035).
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC could not be verified — DNSKEY/DS lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 4035)
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
5 nameservers detected
ns3.cloudflare.com
ns4.cloudflare.com
ns5.cloudflare.com
ns6.cloudflare.com
ns7.cloudflare.com
DNS Provider
Cloudflare
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
10 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Microsoft
Apple
Atlassian
Canva
Cisco Umbrella
Facebook
Google
Miro
Statuspage
Stripe
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
a06dc61325ec1993a130d6ea48e021704972e6e2f3fc66be76b4ce0b7f4fe316b45dbb322ffef35cbc181ff329d49e378c1ce672543002be274340d7620f6ba7
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-103-g7e8bdf8f3
Posture Hash
fa8b7de3342af62b…