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Recon Report

dns-evil-flicker.com
17 Aug 2026, 05:59 UTC · 61.6s ·v26.51.0-102-gd3314d821
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Soft Target
3 defensive layers | 1 attack surface gaps
1 exploitable 1 weakness 4 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 61/100
ACC:92% CUR:40 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Unknown Mail transport security could not be verified — the MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete; a TLS-RPT record alone does not enforce TLS, so this is not evidence enforcement is absent. Re-run before concluding transport encryption is unenforced
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but BIMI could not be verified (a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding) and CAA could not be verified (a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Yes DNSSEC validation is failing, DNS responses cannot be trusted
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Broken — chain of trust broken
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected — single point of failure
DNS Provider
Amazon Route 53
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
949551c69260af15866c7cb22c845bde9220e5fe4fab07503cd5cbdf6b0ee4d6575c04aba613ae1145ef80b48374f34a4aad15fbbc9d8d6091881ceb5cfb083a
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-102-gd3314d821
Posture Hash
eaa3d96848a372e8…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding