Recon Report
nlnetlabs.nl
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Soft Target
4 defensive layers
|
4 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
66/100
ACC:63%
CUR:68
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC requests no enforcement (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Unknown DNSSEC could not be confirmed — re-run to verify. This is not evidence the zone is unsigned (RFC 4035).
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC could not be verified — DNSKEY/DS lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 4035)
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
anyns.pch.net
ns.nlnetlabs.nl
ns1.sidn.nl
ns2.sidn.nl
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:0.vm.rpki.do.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:1006794.1750565392.tc.ripe-hackathon4.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:1750565392.tc.ripe-hackathon4.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:5a03a7bdeb0029ac-1750565376-1006794.rpkitest4.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:adriaan.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:afgepunt.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:agenda.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:agent.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alcatraz.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alpha.nlnetlabs.nl source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:alterdon.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:apartment.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:atvapi.tug.do.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:mailbox.org first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:autodiscover.nlnetlabs.nl source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-06-29T15:54:53 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:aws.manson.nlnetlabs.nl source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:aws.phare.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:aws.taghi.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:aws.zuul.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:axiom.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:azkaban.nlnetlabs.nl source:external_tools] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
1Password
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
b1c64a33120b861edecd88d23c27cdc7599ed767c7e8f513a333ef60723acec8f6b765c8b97a13c9187d8ba7dbca2c38f87abf58b551547590abb3081bcf5ded
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-77-g96ff3d78b
Posture Hash
32905428d8ad98cf…