Recon Report
defcon.org
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
8 defensive layers
|
1 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
63/100
ACC:54%
CUR:74
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes Both MTA-STS and DANE enforce encrypted mail delivery
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforce mode — senders required to use TLS
TLS-RPT
TLS-RPT configured — TLS failures are reported to the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "harica.gr"
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed; a validating resolver confirmed the cryptographic chain of trust via the AD flag (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Inherited
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
dns-1.datamerica.com
dns-3.datamerica.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-22T17:52:00 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:databank.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2026-07-17T21:53:49 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:dc34-media.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2026-07-17T22:17:44 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:dctv.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-08-06T23:31:00 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:dctv2.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-20T17:28:18 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:forum.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-22T17:55:27 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:info.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-25T06:46:28 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:lists.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-07-12T23:59:33 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:me.shop.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-03T06:06:05 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:media.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-03-03T06:06:05 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:mta-sts.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-07-10T01:24:06 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:noc.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-22T18:05:04 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:plus.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:11 first_seen:2026-07-22T08:49:02 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:sg.shop.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-01-27T02:09:40 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:shop.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:8 first_seen:2026-08-03T12:35:20 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services Let's Encrypt] name:training.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:10 first_seen:2026-07-26T08:50:33 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt Google Trust Services] name:us.shop.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-20T17:43:27 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:v4-tracker.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-20T17:43:27 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:v6-tracker.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2026-07-17T22:16:42 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:wifi.defcon.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2026-07-17T22:16:42 is_current:true issuers:[Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA] name:wifireg.defcon.org source:ct] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
381e0ec6a29bd36307ce6f65dd6096268acc574824888d5865ad224577f344e7d882d3e45438f8640d207d074de7c7b954d60bcb38a1412def9396ab3445706f
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Posture Hash
11ad248e7a6c863f…