Recon Report
caloocanservices.online
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Hardened
3 defensive layers
|
6 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
73/100
ACC:66%
CUR:81
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partly SPF and DMARC are enforced at p=quarantine, 100% (RFC 7489 §6.3) — receivers accept failing mail and set it aside, so a spoofed message still reaches the mailbox in spam or junk rather than being refused
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) leave brand impersonation largely unaddressed
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Partially Signed — chain of trust broken
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ns03.domaincontrol.com
ns04.domaincontrol.com
DNS Provider
GoDaddy
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:apps.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:demo.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:email.secureserver.net first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:email.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:health.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:it.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:payment.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:caloocanservices.online first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.caloocanservices.online source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
e378eab5ac5d2ac48c87881c6d2772862e39a17d828edc93f99be384d89069079d8a2e8fd02e7f1613dab834d91ca0f40e9f730897e232b3713fa0d7e30908f0
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Posture Hash
f3fde3bf3ba36253…