Recon Report
ietf.org
Golden-fixture baseline domain.
This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Soft Target
6 defensive layers
|
3 attack surface gaps
1 weakness
2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
66/100
ACC:61%
CUR:71
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC requests no enforcement (p=none)
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE TLSA records pin certificates via DNSSEC — MITM requires compromising the DNS chain
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
BIMI configured — brand logo verified in email clients. Harder to impersonate visually.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed; a validating resolver confirmed the cryptographic chain of trust via the AD flag (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Inherited
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
jill.ns.cloudflare.com
ken.ns.cloudflare.com
DNS Provider
Cloudflare
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-06-21T02:19:47Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:account-cdn.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2026-06-21T01:29:56Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:account.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-05-17T10:44:26Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:alertmanager.meeting.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:16 first_seen:2026-06-01 is_current:true issuers:[] name:analytics.ietf.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:auth-01-cn.meeting.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:auth-02-cn.meeting.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:16 first_seen:2026-06-01 is_current:true issuers:[] name:auth.ietf.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:author-tools.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:authors.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-07-20T07:56:54Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:avatars.account.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:bib.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:6 first_seen:2026-06-09T02:26:10Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:bibxml.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:chairs.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:codimd.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:16 first_seen:2026-06-01 is_current:true issuers:[] name:dashboard.ietf.org source:dns] |
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-05-17T10:44:26Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:dashboard.meeting.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:datatracker.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-06-11T18:34:57Z is_current:true issuers:[] name:deadmon.meeting.ietf.org source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:deadperson-cn.meeting.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:deadperson.meeting.ietf.org source:external_tools] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
0b88713dce1f232f8ad606d59d13637df4159502ec765f4df02d4314d0ac7e6b398fa4a699628c291cf3f20f760e4b9d9252ddc870b85b804739bf5f1f3c8073
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Posture Hash
23dceb43cfb847b5…