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Recon Report

example.com
12 Aug 2026, 13:13 UTC · 57.3s ·v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Golden-fixture baseline domain. This domain is part of the golden-fixture corpus: its recorded scan snapshot is the tool's regression baseline. A scan of it reproducing the snapshot is the baseline returning its own value — expected agreement, not independent validation.
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Hardened
4 defensive layers | 5 attack surface gaps
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 66/100
ACC:61% CUR:71 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=reject — hard enforcement. Spoofing will be rejected.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? No DNSSEC signed; a validating resolver confirmed the cryptographic chain of trust via the AD flag (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Inherited
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
elliott.ns.cloudflare.com hera.ns.cloudflare.com
DNS Provider
Cloudflare
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2025-12-02T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited] name:www.example.com source:ct]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
fce41f183e651f7e4602346c396c33696b85c52e60824cc9f319dfc3cc79fb5a1433374044a5161ce6fa6b9026d033c0158f72fd9d0f8cece716de3c6774c959
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Posture Hash
692a1c18a4406fbe…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding