Recon Report
sandi.net
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Moderate
3 defensive layers
|
5 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
72/100
ACC:66%
CUR:79
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partly DMARC quarantine applies to only part of the mail stream (RFC 7489 §6.3), and quarantined mail is delivered to spam rather than refused — the uncovered remainder is delivered normally
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) leave brand impersonation largely unaddressed
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
2 nameservers detected
ns39.domaincontrol.com
ns40.domaincontrol.com
DNS Provider
GoDaddy
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-02-10 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:adfs.sandi.net source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:adfs19.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:1 cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:2026-02-10 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:autodiscover.sandi.net source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp01.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp02.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp03.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp04.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp05.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteapp06.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ccteservice.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:cvdt.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc2-ise-pan-01.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc2-ise-psn-01.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc2-ise-psn-02.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc3-ise-pan-01.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc3-ise-psn-01.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2026-03-30T18:19:38 is_current:true issuers:[GoDaddy.com, Inc.] name:dc3-ise-psn-02.sandi.net source:ct] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:destiny.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:destinytest.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
map[cert_count:— first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:dwa.sandi.net source:external_tools] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records
Adobe
Apple
DocuSign
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
b46a7cd1b83ab0d9146f27b72933c422403a441b12d1d45fe9faae568ecc84edacae0b90c0c86c161599e136a73e4d8e332b02908ce599fac57f3241dc1d4eae
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-119-g1c2a42874
Posture Hash
e16dc7dd13504e01…