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Recon Report

wearetma.com
30 Jul 2026, 00:57 UTC · 66.6s ·v26.50.05-409-g73f79445e
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
2 defensive layers | 7 attack surface gaps
2 weaknesses 2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 68/100
ACC:68% CUR:67 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partially DMARC present but no SPF
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
4 nameservers detected
pdns82.ultradns.biz pdns82.ultradns.com pdns82.ultradns.net pdns82.ultradns.org
DNS Provider
UltraDNS
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:5 cname_target:mk8aa5hfrnt9.wpeproxy.com first_seen:2026-07-07T04:26:56 is_current:true issuers:[Google Trust Services] name:share.wearetma.com source:ct]
map[cert_count:10 cname_target:30lbpkk6mcjd.wpeproxy.com first_seen:2026-07-16T23:49:45 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:www.wearetma.com source:ct]
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
cb1055c63aee51737c6a6f72b20457191d5ac9ff36913a18bae4a031ebcbf4acfef783d986e89737abd209964c022dc251c8d730202dd02aa797412a6e636716
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-409-g73f79445e
Posture Hash
ff22028caa9ed5cc…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding