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Recon Report

www.soa.ac.in
24 Jul 2026, 12:03 UTC · 65.1s ·v26.50.05-344-gc4825d920
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: Moderate
4 defensive layers | 5 attack surface gaps
3 weaknesses 2 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 64/100
ACC:61% CUR:68 MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Partially DMARC present but no SPF
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
No SPF record — any server can claim to send from this domain
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — limited discovery
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
DANE could not be verified — TLSA lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 6698)
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
ext-cust.squarespace.com.
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC signed (DNSKEY + DS present), but chain-of-trust validation was not confirmed on our resolver path (AD flag unset, RFC 4035 §3.2.3) — protection depends on the client using a validating resolver
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC Signed
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
1 nameserver detected — single point of failure
ext-cust.squarespace.com
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
No SaaS verification records found
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
51f9bc3c4e336d2b243d785a75a8ec7c33f8080a723d3e29d0c4d314758ece932a99eb32f2ccc050e2aa011943fef9d8c65d6d624f1bbe0e2b8bc3814841bf06
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.50.05-344-gc4825d920
Posture Hash
395c9c5732abd21f…
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding